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Who is the Museum Afraid of?
Interview for the Director of Security magazine
March 2009 (N 2)
May it be a visitor, a state or a sponsor conflicts may arise everywhere
and with everything.
When we are talking about the security of the museums we usually mean
physical protection of the exhibits, fire protection, antitheft protection,
vandalism protection... But at the same time there are a lot of other
threats. For example, there are cases when the exhibits are confiscated
by the state or such cases that has recently become more and more popular
to demand to provide sacred objects for the use in church rituals. Is the museum
able to avoid such situations? Mikhail Piotrovsky, the director
of the State Hermitage Museum, is telling the reporter of the Director
of Security about this.
- Museum studies things, moves them, and presents them to public and specialists.
This is always risk-bearing, but it is the risk that comprises
the meaning of the existence of a museum. That is why we should work a very
flexible security scheme through considering that it should protect
the museum and remembering that there are people who come and go, live
and sing songs... These songs will make glass tremble and the paint from the paintings
fall off and we can not and should not prohibit this completely.
(Rock-concerts are held at the Palace Square among others. - Editor’s
note). The combination of risk and storing is a problem that comprises
the specific character of the museum that is why here it is necessary
to have a totally different particular approach to security.
The state is always trying to sell something or to use cultural monuments
for the benefit of the country or the state apparatus but not for the benefit
of culture itself. This can be selling articles abroad or granting
sacred objects on the basis of some political considerations. This is a normal
situation because museum is culture and culture is in a constant
conflict with the state. It also goes for the church. These conflicts
are rather often fomented although as a matter of fact there are no solid
reasons for the conflict. Yes, there are objects that participated in the rituals
of the church and most of them are stored in the museums,
yet there is no need to grant them. This is a question of preservation
of the articles themselves and the museums - all that enters the museum
becomes a part of a single organism that inhabits the storerooms, the exhibition
halls and restoration workshops. If we extract something from somewhere
we cause severe injuries to the museum. If we talk about the relations
with the church then the recipe here is very easy: all the objects
that ended in the museum during the Soviet times did not just 'appear’
to be there, they were saved. All the rest was sent for remelting. So every
time the conversation starts with such remarks as ‘You are keeping
stolen things’ I end it abruptly. Copies can be made from the most of the objects
and they can function in the rituals just like the originals
that should stay in the museum. All the rest can be well negotiated.
The interests of sponsors and museums do not always coincide and in order
to avoid conflicts there should be distinct and clear agreements about
what is possible and what is not.
When the sponsor visits the museum it is one thing, but when he wants
to celebrate his wedding in the museum then it is totally another thing.
We never do such things and for us, as the Imperial residence, one of the biggest
museums of the world and the national shrine, this is absolutely
unacceptable. But the Hermitage is the presidential object and this does
not threaten us at the highest level. At the middle level such problems
always exist but we have very distinct agreements with our sponsors so difficulties
do not arise.
Any human being constitutes a threat for the museum because the contradiction
between storing and displaying is always risky and divergence of interests
may happen everywhere. A conflict may arise between the visitors and the museum
(a primitive example, it might be too cold for the person, but if it is warm
for the person then it is bad for the paintings). Or there
is a long queue to the ticket office, the person does not want to stand
in a queue but at the same time the queue regulates the number of people
present in the museum. There are fire safety rules in accordance with which
a large number of people can not be in the museum. The number of places
in the cloakroom is also limited. But the person wants to entre
the museum at once. So there is a conflict.
- Are curators, museum attendants and other staff members that one
way or another contact with the visitors of the museum more focused on demonstrating or preserving?
- Undoubtedly, the main goal of the museum attendants who are sitting
in the halls is to preserve. There are guides who are demonstrating. In the Hermitage
the museum attendants are not even allowed to give explanations
to the visitors because that way they can be distracted from their main
duty. Though, there are a lot of people in the museum and people can get
lost sometimes so the museum attendants help them. But their main goal
is to watch over that nobody comes too close, touches the paintings and that
everything is in order. The goal of the museum attendant is also
to preserve, to make sure that the objects are safe.Very often we have
problems: when we need to transport the exhibits to the exhibitions the museum
attendant seeks his or her objects to stay where they are for there
is a risk that something might happen to them. Then we decide together
whether this is overcautiousness or really a concern for the object. But at the same
time there are departments in the museum that are oriented
towards demonstration. For example, the departments of design have demonstration
as their main goal; scientific officers try hard to make their halls interesting
and informative. All that should be interrelated.
- If we talk about the theft in the museums and refer to history then
we see that the museum staff 'makes an exhibition of itself' more often
then others. You have repeatedly stated in your interviews that before
you were concerned with the protection of the outer boundaries and just
now started to protect from 'your own people'. How painful is that?
- We should protect from different people and those people who are called
'staff' are also different. However strange it may seem but in the first
place we should protect from those who protect. They are responsible for the most
theft: these were the policemen in the State Russian Museum,
these were the people who installed the warning system in the Vienna Museum...
There were cases of theft by the guards attending the personnel security
systems at our museum. It should be pointed out that theft by the museum
attendants is not possible without their participation. But, undoubtedly,
we should exercise control over the museum attendants, it should be a flexible
combination of surveillance and trust. It is impossible to manage
without trust in the museum system: the museum attendant moves the exhibits,
changes the dating, the objects are taken to the exhibitions... And, indeed,
there can not be a hundred percent safety guarantee, otherwise it will
be impossible to organize exhibitions and research.
I believe we had too much trust on the assumptions of the previous time.
Now the psychology of people has changed that is why we should enhance
the control. And the most important here is to be in the constant state
of alarm, readiness and intensity, but at the same time we should understand
that the situation might change. Now the control has been tightened, may
be there will be a moment when it is relieved. Yes, there are regulations,
rules but they protect us only partially. That is why we should constantly
change protection schemes (like in a secure setting), change security
systems, actions in various emergency situations. The Hermitage has always
received plenty of money for the security that is why we try to project
our technical systems in the way when they are changed every five years.
A flexible system that will bevsensible to any changes is needed... Alongside
with this we should not forget that our main threat is flood, fire and war.
- Are you ready for such emergency situations now? I have read that
in 1941 the main exposition was prepared for the evacuation in just six
days. At the same time I got a distinct feeling that it was possible only
because the directorate, despite all the accusations in the overcautiousness,
was stocking up containers and packaging material.
- The directorate was not overcautious; it was, on pain of death, complying
with the order to be ready for the evacuation. At the same time the director
could be shot for alarmism, so there was risk in both situations.
Now our museum (like any other regular museum) has the action plan for any
situation: where people should assemble, and where things should be assembled,
where and how the evacuations should take place. Naturally,
a modern war is totally different; it won’t happen that we load everything
on two special trains and send them to Sverdlovsk. But we are ready for the present
day wars this is why we have the department of emergency situations.
Although, if we look upon this realistically, then we should speak about
readiness for the terroristic attacks, fires and floods rather than wars,
so the most part of our technical means is aimed at that. At the same
time the human factor is very important: we can install a lot of sensors,
but if they go off then the people should be present on the site. There
should be a fire station (we have this), policeman battalion (it is standing
guard over the perimeter)... People react better than any equipment.
- How often do you turn to the external organizations that insure
protection? How do you select them?
- There is a policemen battalion that guards us; it also provides security
when we transport the objects. We are constantly in touch; we have agreements,
now we are negotiating the establishment of several more policeman posts.
Our protection is carried out by the state structures although there were
attempts to do this with the help of some private security firms. The security
firms have their own advantages and disadvantages, but they
also make it more complicated, particularly, from the bureaucratic
point of view.
- As far as I understand, the serious problem is the obligatory necessity
to invite tenders for the facilitation of security services or installation
of the security systems for the museums since all the participants should
be provided with the full information about the object and that is a serious
safety risk.
- This is absolutely correct. The 94th federal law as it presents itself
as totally subversive. This is the reason why I should provide all the tender
participants with all the materials in order to choose who will
protect us. So far we managed to avoid such situations and we do not invite
tenders. But I hope that soon this law will be seriously reconsidered.
- How did you manage without the tenders? For example, a biometric
security system was installed in the Hermitage...
- We installed it on a trial basis and you don’t need a tender for this,
it was installed free of charge. When we implement it on the regular basis
we should find a way to manage without tenders.
- Quite often the Hermitage organizes the exhibitions in the provinces.
How do you estimate the overall level of protection of the Russian museums?
Do they have any serious problems with the security protection?
- We have a very strict and tough security policy. There is a list of 300-400 questions
to which the museum should give the affirmative answer.
Among them are the questions concerning the security starting with the strength
of the windows and ending with the shortest period of time the police
should arrive in case the security alarm goes off. In this respect
we are very tough and as a result the decision on the exhibition of the Hermitage
is made on the local authorities’ level that, as a rule, also
find the money for the protection at the end. Thereby we re-equipped several
museums in the country this way.
Despite all the talks I nevertheless believe that the Russian museums
in general are protected rather well, no worse than other museums in the world.
And it seems to me that we should be grateful to them for remaining
unchanged while during the last 20 years almost everything in the country
changed the form of property and the owners. Those exhibits that were
missing during the inspections are so few in comparison to all those that
were preserved in the museum collection.
Unfortunately, nowadays the money matters the most not just in Russia
but all over the world and the understanding that the museum is a special
place, where one should not speak loud, steal, even if you are a thief,
is fading. We are producing more and more advanced security systems but people’s
psychology is changing so we have to come up with the new ways
of protection. Such is life.
Director of Security magazine, N 2 March 2009
Storage Regulations
How to preserve the contents of the safe that is wide open? Ask the Director of the Museum
Director of Security is starting to publish a series of articles
that will tell about the special features of the protection of the enterprises
and organizations workings in various sectors. The standing head is opened
by the story about... the museum. Perhaps, this is an unexpected but at the same
time a no less logical decision: the main goal of the museum
is to preserve the cultural values so it is a kind of a security enterprise
per se. At the same time the museum has to provide access to these
values so the question of the security is pressing.
From the point of view of the interest to the work of the security services
the State Hermitage Museum ranks first. As one of the oldest museums in Russia
it uses, probably, the widest range of security measures from the ratter
cats to the biometric systems. The museum where the large-scale
cases of theft from the funds were classified as the robbery of the century
in 2006 provoked the All-Russian inspection of the museum collections
and formed a new way of perceiving the secure preservation issues. The museum
is a system of secure preservation of the funds that is currently
considered to be the best in Russia.
The fund storage of the Hermitage is a complex of buildings of the restoration
and storage Staraya Derevnya centre, the construction of which
still continues on the skirts of St. Petersburg. The first stage was instituted
in 2003 and according to the director of the State Hermitage Museum Mikhail
Piotrovsky it is the most protected museum storage in the world. That
means that it can become a model for providing safety of cultural values.
The construction of the second stage, which is the main building of the storage,
started in 1990, later it was frozen and the works resumed only
in 2005. And as Mikhail Piotrovsky is telling us at that the activation
of the construction works was directly influenced by the incidents of theft
from the storerooms of the Hermitage. Before that the financing
of the construction and the equipment for the storages of the Russian
museums was done reluctantly: ‘Nobody understood why it was the storages
that were so important but not the restoration of the gilding in the museum
halls." But now according to the main specialist of the security services
of the fund storage Oleg Boev, ‘neither a cat, nor a bird except perhaps
a spider’ will break inside unauthorized, and by the time the second stage
is instituted a ‘security super system will be installed here and by its ideology
it moves to the forefront in Europe’.
The new building of the fund storage is, of course, devoid of charm of
the old times and pathos of the imperial palace. At the same time it represents
practically unlimited possibilities for the projecting of the security
and fire alarms, the systems of conditioning and ventilation, heating
and water management, access control and video surveillance, - the blocks
that compose the security of the museum in whole and its exhibits inìparticular.
OBSERVING THE OBSERVING
The security system of the fund storage itself is a compound integrated
complex that consists of the modules of the security alarm system, access
control, video surveillance system, system of biometric control, system
of recognition and recoding of the moving vehicles and so forth. All the data
is entered to the main console of the integrated security system.
Moreover, there is a number of the additional submodules such as the graphic
workstation that demonstrates visually all the premises of the storage
and all the sensors installed in the premises are connected to it (volume
change sensor, break-in sensor, window break sensor - over 2000 sensor
all in all).
All that is happening in the fund storage is in the vigilant eye of the closed
circuit television. Naturally, it is impossible to visually track
all what is going on at all the sites. But in this case this is not necessary:
the video surveillance system acts as the subsidiary. If the alarm goes
off the readings of the cameras that are the closest to the site of occurrence
will be displayed and the operator will be able to see everything what
is going on with his own eyes and immediately react: without leaving his place
he can block the doors, limit access rights on the card of the staff
member, etc.
Sitting by the monitor the operator is able to have full control over
everything up to opening and closing of the doors (their state is displayed
in real-time mode) by choosing the most convenient scheme of display -
in a form of icons or structured table. The place where the slightest
deviance is observed is detected immediately. So far the signals are received
from the premises adjacent to the construction site of the second stage,
namely, break-in sensors that are installed along the perimeter and that
are so sensitive that they are activated by every engagement of the jackhammer.
The system of the perimeter security is based on the classic scheme:
the external mechanical fencing (it is a very light fence that does not encumber
space) and the infrared perimeter security system that as a whole
create some kind of 'three-dimensional fence'. Breaking in parameters
may vary; now small animals and birds may freely break it, but the way
is closed for a person (even a child).
FRONT-DOOR SECURITY OF THE 21ST CENTURY
But the threat can be not just external but also internal. After the case
of ‘theft from the Hermitage’ the internal security policy was reconsidered
in the biggest Russian museum. Now all the staff members of the fund storage
are supplied with access control cards so that all their movements are regulated
firmly by the security services. The rights are assigned on the program
level since every staff member has his or her own routes and to Oleg
Boev if the person is occupied on the first floor then
he or she has no need to work on the fifth floor so he or she won’t be able to access there.
The first 'check point' that is faced by the staff members when they
come to work is the point of the biometric control where they should 'show
their face'. Until the person is identified his or her access card remains
blocked. Operation principle of the biometric system is based on the analysis
of the brainpan parameters that is why any external changes (such as dental
abscess, bump on the head, change of a hairdo, etc.) present no obstacle
for the identification. Usually biometric security systems work on identifying
faces by the comparison of the number of dots. The system installed in the Staraya
Derevnya is more advanced; here the so called mask of curvature
is laid over the parameters so the identification is possible for full
face and half face and it is impossible to trick it by presenting a photograph.
The scanner also reads the heat coefficient so the identification can
be passed only by a live person, three-dimensional and warm.
The biometric system combined with the personal access cards is a perfect
front-door security. The control points (turnstiles) of the fund storage
are fully automatic: if you are identified as ‘the insider’ and you provided
the activated access card then you may entre. The keys to the storage
rooms are also issued automatically. At the same time the operator of the security
services at any point can receive the information about the location
of any employee. "This can be called total control,"
says Oleg Boev. "Perhaps, this is not proper but should special circumstances
arise then we can receive a full report about the actions of any employee
'inside' and 'out'. I would like to mention that besides the main console
there is also my console, the system that exercise surveillance functions
over the security services employees. We were bound to enter this level
of control."
PLEASE, DO NOT TOUCH
The fund storage of the Hermitage works on the principle of the open
storage, i.e. the most valuable exhibits are available for the examination.
The only difference from a regular museum is that the visitors do not
come here individually, but only with the guide. That is why there is the third
security line, namely, the protection of the exhibits from the visitors.
Here various methods are used including psychological. As Oleg
Boev tells, when the alarm system was assembled in the premises the lamps
that had not been yet inserted in the cabling were blinking from time
to time, it appeared that it disciplined the excursionists (among them
there were many children whose behaviour is rather emotional). After that
the security services asked the specialists from the maintenance department
not to hide the alarm system but to leave it in view; it perfectly fit
into the high-tech style of the building.
One more innovation in the sphere of physical protection of the exhibition
that is implemented in the fund storage is the approaching sensor that
reacts to the attempt to break the prohibition 'please, do not touch'
but not to the violation of the prohibition itself: if the visitor comes
too close the warning signal is heard. Pressure sensors are also developed:
they remember the weight of the exhibit that is put on top of them and react
to any changes in the pressure in one way or another. Any attempt
of physical influence on the exhibit results in the activation of both
sensors and that produces the overall alert.
In order to describe the methods of physical protection of the exhibits
used in the fund storage in detail, as stated by deputy director of the
Hermitage Alexei Bogdanov, at least one semester is necessary (exactly
one semester is dedicated to the course that is given by the museum employees
to the students of the University of Technology, future specialists in the museum
security). But according to Oleg Boev even now security systems
follow through with the status of the museum and its level. There are lot
of innovations ahead. For example, now the new biometric device
is tested in the fund storage. This device allows recognizing a person
in motion by identifying his or her parameters literally on the run.
ALL THE BEST TO THE EXHIBITS
"I believe that security is a complex of measures combined as a single
whole and the main merit of our system is exactly the interaction
of all its modules," says Oleg Boev. And this does not differ in word
and in deed: the security in the Staraya Devernya means not just
physical, but also fire and even climate security.
"The main goal for all of us is to preserve the objects of the cultural
heritage that is why it is extremely important to follow the microclimate
parameters inside the premises where the exhibits are kept," the leading
engineer of the conditioning system Ivan Obmornov demonstrates
the system of conditioning and ventilation that adjusts the air to the set
parameters of temperature and humidity. The automatic system that
is operated by the computer secures the necessary temperature in the storage
premises, restoration laboratories and administrative premises. At the same
time ‘the interests of the exhibits’ take priority: according to Ivan
Obmornov ‘it is well-know that no man is indispensible but there
are indispensible exhibits’.
For each of the 38 storage premises the parameters set by the attendant
are strictly observed: the computer-controlled system manages with that
without any additional support. A particular task is the acclimatization
of the exhibits brought from the different climatic zones. A drastic climate
change is intolerable: the wooden objects may start to crack or collect
moisture very quickly. That is why there are special acclimatization premises
in the fund storage where the climatic variables may change very slowly
and gradually. For example, the wooden sculpture of the Garuda eagle,
brought from Indonesia, was kept there for several months.
The work data of other technical systems is also displayed on the control
panel of the climatic systems. Here, for example, one can receive the data
about the work of the boiler house, the outdoor lighting and so on.
In cases of the deviance the alarm signal is heard and the operator makes
the decision about further actions.
Any computer-controlled system has one disadvantage: they are too closely
connected with electricity. That is why the fund storage provides for the double
security: besides the two power lead terminals with the automatic
changeover from the city there is also the self-contained uninterruptible
power supply rated at the power support of all the automatic devices for the period of two days.
Fire protection is at once carried out by the two fire-extinguishing
systems - active and passive.
The passive one is used in the premises where people work; it reports
the control panel that there is ignition somewhere. The active one, which
is a gas fire-extinguishing system, is installed in the storage premises,
where there are no permanent work places; it copes with the problems totally
independently. After the fire alarm the systems begin to interact: the sound
signalling turns on, both internal and external signals, and in 30 seconds
(within this period of time the people that are here should
leave the premises) the premises are fully closed and the fire-extinguishing
composition, Freon 13 B1 that does not harm neither the exhibits nor people
begins to come inside. It is also unique in a way that it works in a very
small concentration, 3-5% that is why the stock intended for all the 38 storage
premises is only 4,730 litres.
The gas station is not located in the basement or in the technical attic
premises (as usual), it is situated in the very centre of the building
so the gas reaches the premises as fast as possible. Depending on the
remoteness of the storage room the gas should reach them within 13 up
to 53 seconds.
However, so far the active fire-extinguishing system has not been activated
even once (if not to mention the acceptance of the system). Unlike the passive
system that is sensitive to the air density and regularly makes
false alarms in the working premises over the turned on iron or a microwave
oven.
The employees operating the fire-extinguishing system consider this reaction
as a good sign. The system reacts as it should so it is better to react
upon the false alarm ten times than to miss the actual alarm once. However,
such attitude to that issue is reasonable for the whole security system
of the fund storage.
Ekaterina Kramer
Director of Security magazine, N 2 March 2009
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